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Abstract
We develop a real options model for evaluating and optimizing an R&D project. The
model can capture key features of R&D, including research duration, growth opportunity,
debt nancing, and uncertainty of technological, demand market, and rival preemption.
Nevertheless, it is computationally tractable and thus helps practitioners to evaluate var-
ious cases of R&D investment. Further, by analyzing the model with a wide range of
parameter values, we unveil the interactions of key R&D features. The eect of duration
on investment depends on whether there is a possibility of rival preemption. Higher uncer-
tainty of research duration speeds up project inception in the presence of rival preemption.
Higher uncertainty of technological success, combined with a growth opportunity embed-
ded in the R&D project, accelerates investment. Debt nancing can greatly decrease time
lag between the rst stage project and growth project. These results are consistent with
the empirical evidence.
JEL Classications Code: G31; G33; 032.
Keywords: R&D; technological uncertainty; investment lag; real options; compound
option.
This is the rst version on 1 April, 2014.
yCorresponding Author. Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University, 1-7 Machikaneyama, Toyonaka,
Osaka 560-0043, Japan, E-mail: nishihara@econ.osaka-u.ac.jp, Phone: 81-6-6850-5242, Fax: 81-6-6850-5277
1
1 Introduction
Research and development (R&D) investment does not only bring the progress of society
via innovation and spillover eects but also is a key determinant of a rm's long-term
growth. It is critical for a rm's management to accurately evaluate and execute an R&D
project. This paper contributes both theory and practice by developing a tractable model
for evaluating and optimizing R&D investment as well as unveiling interactions of several
features associated with R&D investment.
The diculties of R&D management lie in that three types of uncertainty are in-
evitably embedded in R&D projects. The rst is technological uncertainty. Technological
specications, time schedule, and budget are planned before project initiation. However,
in many cases, the outcome does not go successfully as planned (e.g. Raz, Shenhar, and
Dvir (2002)). The risks of technological success, research duration, and investment costs
are called technological uncertainty. The second is market uncertainty. This stands for
uncertain cash ow, which a newly developed technology will generate. The dynamics of
cash ow is not deterministic but aected by product-specic and macroeconomic shocks
on demand in the product market. The third is a risk of rival preemption. For instance,
if a competitor takes out a patent for a technology rst, an R&D project concerning the
technology will be aborted.
In practice, it is challenging to evaluate an R&D project and make a managerial
decision of R&D involving these risks (e.g. Raz, Shenhar, and Dvir (2002)). Although
the Net Present Value (NPV) method remains dominant for project valuation in the real
world, there is an observed growing trend that the real options method1 is adopted as
a complement (e.g. Hartmann and Hassan (2006) and Baker, Dutta, and Saadi (2011)).
Without doubt, the academic literature argues that the real options methodology adds
value to project valuation involving high uncertainty and managerial exibility, such as
R&D projects. There have been a lot of case studies that apply the real options method to
R&D project valuation (e.g., Perlitz, Peske, and Schrank (1999), Loch and Bode-Greuel
(2001), Lee and Paxson (2001), and Cassimon, Backer, Engelenc, Wouwee, and Yordanovf
(2011)).
Instead of examining a case study for a specic company or project, this paper develops
a generic and tractable model of R&D investment so that one can analyze various cases
of R&D investment with it. We extend the framework of American compound option as
follows. Consider a rm that has the timing option to initiate an R&D project by paying
a sunk cost. The project will take time to complete, and after completion, the developed
technology will generate cash ow and a growth opportunity. When the rm exercises
the growth option by paying a sunk cost, it will increase cash ow from the technology.
1The real options method is no longer a new concept because it has already been developed for more
than thirty years. For details, we recommend a recent textbook Guthrie (2009) to both academicians and
practitioners.
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We consider this sort of compound option model, because growth opportunities, such as
expanding production, starting a license business, and applying the new technology to
other products, are frequently associated with R&D investment (e.g., Loch and Bode-
Greuel (2001), Ho, Tjahjapranata, and Yap (2006), and Cassimon, Backer, Engelenc,
Wouwee, and Yordanovf (2011)).
Furthermore, our model takes into consideration the three types of uncertainty, namely,
technological, market, and rival preemption uncertainty. The level of technological success
that inuences cash ow, the lag between project inception and completion (henceforth
research duration), and total costs are not deterministic but random, and the rm knows
only their prior distributions. These technological risks are specic of R&D project valua-
tion, but the existent real options models miss any of the three points. We do not propose
any new setup with regard to market uncertainty. Instead, based on the standard litera-
ture, we assume that the dynamics of cash ow from the technology follows a stochastic
process. We assume that the project value is potentially eliminated by rival preemption
before project completion. The rival preemption occurs randomly, and the rm knows
only its distribution. In other words, the rm does not possess the full information of its
rival rms' R&D progress. We also extend the base model to a case with debt nancing
because an increasing number of papers, both theoretically and empirically, have pointed
out the signicance of nancing sources.2
Before elaborating on the results, we dierentiate our model from the most related and
dominant models by Bar-Ilan and Strange (1998) and Weeds (2002). The model by Bar-
Ilan and Strange (1998), like our model, can capture the eects of a growth opportunity
and investment lag, but it does not include uncertainty of technological success, total costs,
duration, and rival preemption. Weeds (2002) proposed a model with uncertain research
duration and rival preemption, but the model does not include a growth opportunity and
uncertainty of technological success and total costs. In addition, her assumptions of full
information of rival rms and Poisson distributed duration are not very practical. We also
note that the above models, unlike our model, do not include a case with debt nancing.
Thus, our model better helps evaluating an R&D project involving the three types of
uncertainty compared to the previous models.
Our analysis of the model yields several empirical implications. First, we unveil interac-
tions between research duration and rival preemption. In the absence of rival preemption,
the rm tends to accelerate investment in the R&D project with longer duration because
market demand at completion time is expected to be higher. This result is known in
investment timing models with investment lags (e.g., Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) and
Bar-Ilan and Strange (1998)). Notably, we show that a slight possibility of rival pre-
emption changes the duration eect. Longer duration increases the possibility of rival
2An incomplete list includes Mauer and Sarkar (2005), Sundaresan and Wang (2007), and Nishihara and
Shibata (2013) in the real options studies, and Ho, Tjahjapranata, and Yap (2006), Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen
(2009), and Hall and Lerner (2009) in the empirical studies of R&D.
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preemption and decreases the project value. As this negative eect is much stronger than
the positive eect, the eect of duration on investment becomes negative in the presence
of rival preemption.
Next, we show that higher uncertainty of research duration and technological suc-
cess drives the rm to launch the R&D project earlier. This leads to the lesson that
uncertainty-investment sensitivity depends on the type of uncertainty. Indeed, the eect
of market uncertainty on investment timing tends to be negative because higher market
uncertainty increases the incentive for the rm to delay investment and receive additional
information. On the other hand, technological uncertainty will be dissolved, not by wait-
ing but by nishing the project. The R&D project value is likely to be convex with respect
to research duration and levels of technological success. The former is caused primarily
by the possibility of rival preemption, whereas the latter stems mainly from the growth
option embedded in the R&D project. Because of this convexity, the higher uncertainty
of research duration and technological success increases the project value, and hence, en-
courages investment in the R&D project. Our result is novel and can potentially account
for empirical ndings by Driver, Temple, and Urga (2006). They found that industries
with high R&D intensity tend to indicate a positive eect of uncertainty on investment.
As for debt nancing, we have empirical implications as follows. Access to debt nanc-
ing for the growth project increases the project value and accelerates investment. This
is straightforward and consistent with previous results in the literature (e.g., Hennessy
(2004), Mauer and Sarkar (2005), and Sundaresan and Wang (2007)). More interest-
ingly, the eects of debt nancing on the rst stage project are weaker than that on
the growth project, which implies that the rm can reap the growth opportunity from
the R&D project earlier by debt nancing. A large number of empirical studies showed
that large rms have advantages over small rms in prots from R&D projects (e.g., Ho,
Tjahjapranata, and Yap (2006)). Our result may be related to the empirical nding be-
cause larger rms, due to less nancing costs, are more likely to take the optimal capital
structure.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the model
setup and solutions. In Section 3, we exercise numerical analysis and provide empirical
implications. In particular, we focus on interactions between research duration and rival
preemption in Section 3.2, interactions between the growth option and uncertainty of
technological success in Section 3.3, and eects of leverage in Section 3.4. Section 4
briey summarizes the paper.
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2 The model
2.1 Setup
We consider a rm that has an option to initiate an R&D project by paying the sunk cost
I0. The project will take T1 years until completion. We call T1 research duration. After
completion, the rm will receive an instantaneous cash ow A1X(t) at time t.
3 Further-
more, we assume that the rm has a growth opportunity, such as expanding production,
starting a license business, and applying the new technology to other products (e.g., Loch
and Bode-Greuel (2001), Ho, Tjahjapranata, and Yap (2006), and Cassimon, Backer, En-
gelenc, Wouwee, and Yordanovf (2011)). After the rm exercises the growth option by
paying the sunk cost I2, it will receive an increased cash ow A1A2X(t).
Our model includes three types of uncertainty. First at all, we represent market uncer-
tainty by the cash ow X(t), which dynamically changes by project-specic and macroe-
conomic shocks on demand in the product market. Following the standard literature, we
assume that X(t) follows a geometric Brownian motion:
dX(t) = X(t)dt+ X(t)dB(t) (t > 0); X(0) = x;
where B(t) denotes the standard Brownian motion dened in a probability space (
;F ;P)
and ; (> 0) and x(> 0) are constants. For convergence, we assume that r > , where
a positive constant r is the discount rate. For the economic rationale behind these as-
sumptions, refer to standard textbooks such as Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Guthrie
(2009).
Second, we represent technological uncertainty by a random vector (A1; T1; I1). Tech-
nical specications, time schedule, and total costs, which are planned and estimated ex
ante, may not be accomplished ex post (e.g., Raz, Shenhar, and Dvir (2002)). To deal
with the technological risks, we consider the level of technological success, A1, and re-
search duration T1, as random variables. The rm will observe the realized value of A1 at
completion time. At the same time, the rm will observe an extra cost I1. For tractabil-
ity, we assume that (A1; T1; I1) are independent of X(t), which means that technological
and market risks are irrelevant. There is less technological uncertainty for the growth
project, and then, we assume that A2(> 1) and I2 for the growth investment are positive
constants.
The last uncertainty lies in rival preemption. The project value will be greatly de-
stroyed when a competitor completes the similar product rst, especially in competitions
for patents and standardizations (e.g., Weeds (2002)). We assume that the rm does
not have information of the R&D progress of rival rms. Instead, the rm knows that
3Some papers distinguish the lag between project inception and completion (the gestation lag) and project
completion and commercial application (the application lag) (e.g., Pakes and Schankerman (1984)). For sim-
plicity, we assume that the total lag is equal to T1.
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rival preemption may occur following an exponential distribution (Poisson arrival) with
intensity , where  is a positive constant. Technically, until project completion, the cash
ow X(t) will be potentially killed at an instantaneous rate dt.
The model diers from the compound real options model by Bar-Ilan and Strange
(1998) in the sense that we incorporate technological uncertainty (A1; T1; I1) and rival
preemption dt.4 Weeds (2002) also examined rival preemption and uncertainty of re-
search duration. The model, however, does not include technological uncertainty (A1; I1)
and a growth opportunity.5 The model adopts a game-theoretic framework with full infor-
mation and assumes that research duration follows an exponential distribution. Although
the setup is sucient to provide economic implications, it seems almost impossible to
apply the model to a real-world case. Actually, no rm wishes to inform its R&D progress
to competitors, and no one plans Poisson distributed time schedule. In this paper, we
model using a Poisson arrival not research duration, which can be estimated to a degree
but a rival's R&D success, which will be an unexpected event.
2.2 Base problem
In this subsection, we provide technical instructions for how to evaluate and optimize the
R&D project with the three types of uncertainty. We formulate the problem of nding the
project value and the optimal policy as a two stage optimal stopping problem. Similar to
Bar-Ilan and Strange (1998), we need to solve the problem backward. Suppose that the
investment time T , the level of technological success, A1, research duration T1, and extra
cost I1 in the rst stage project are all known. At time s, which is later than completion
time T  + T1, the problem of nding the optimal investment time T  for the growth
project is expressed as the following optimal stopping problem:
V2(X(s); A1) = sup
T s
EX(s)[
Z T 
s
e r(t s)(1  )A1X(t)| {z }
cash ow before growth investment
dt
+
Z 1
T 
e r(t s)(1  )A1A2X(t)| {z }
cash ow after growth investment
dt  e r(T  s)I2]; (1)
where the investment time T  is optimized over all stopping times later than s. The no-
tation EX(s)[] denotes the expectation conditional on X(s), and for later use we introduce
the corporate tax rate  , which is a positive constant. The value function V2(X(s); A1)
in the problem (3) stands for the project value at time s between completion of the rst
stage and initiation of the growth project.
4As a minor dierence, Bar-Ilan and Strange (1998) does not consider prots before completion of the
second stage. They consider duration of the second stage investment, but it is not essential because there is no
investment after completion of the second stage.
5Nishihara and Ohyama (2008) extended Weeds (2002) to a case involving two alternative technologies, but
the model, like Weeds (2002), does not include either technological uncertainty or a growth opportunity.
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Because the rm's expected prots after the investment time T  are equal to
EX(T
)[
Z 1
T 
e r(t T
)(1  )A1A2X(t)dt] = (1  )A1A2
r    X(T
); (2)
we can rewrite (3) as
V2(X(s); A1) =
(1  )A1
r    X(s)| {z }
NPV
+ U2(X(s); A1)| {z }
growth option value
; (3)
where U2(X(s); A1) is the growth option value expressed by
U2(X(s); A1)
= sup
T s
EX(s)[e r(T
 s)

(1  )A1(A2   1)
r    X(T
)  I2

]
=
8>>><>>>:

(1  )A1(A2   1)x(A1)
r      I2

X(s)
x(A1)

(X(s) < x(A1))
(1  )A1(A2   1)X(s)
r      I2 (X(s)  x
(A1)):
(4)
The investment trigger x(A1) and the positive characteristic root  are dened by
x(A1) =
(r   )I2
(   1)(1  )A1(A2   1) : (5)
and
 =
1
2
  
2
+
s

2
  1
2
2
+
2r
2
(> 1); (6)
respectively. For A1 = 0 (failure of the rst stage), we dene x
(A1) =1 and U2(X(s)) =
0. The rm's optimal policy, T  = infft  s j X(t)  x(A1)g, is called the threshold
policy, which means that the rm invests in the growth project as soon as the cash ow
X(t) hits the threshold x(A1). Note that if X(T  + T1)  x(A1) is satised, the rm
proceeds to the second stage immediately after completion of the rst stage.
Next, we turn to a problem of evaluating and optimizing the rst stage investment.
At this moment, the level of technological success, A1, research duration T1, and the
cost I1 are random variables, and the prior distributions of (A1; T1; I1) are known. At
time s( 0), the project value is expressed as the value function of the optimal stopping
problem as follows:
V1(X(s)) = sup
T s
EX(s)[e (r+)(T
 s)
n
e (r+)T1V2(X(T  + T1); A1)  e rT1I1   I0
o
];
(7)
where  is the intensity of rival preemption and V2(X(T
+T1); A1) is given by (3). In (7)
the expectation is taken over all random variables (X(T + T1); A1; T1; I1). The expected
total costs are I0 + E[e rT1I1]. As (T1; I1) are independent of X(t), we can remove I1 by
regarding the estimated total costs I0 + E[e rT1I1] as the initial cost I0. From now on,
without loss of generality, we assume that I1 = 0.
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Because the expected prots after the investment time T  are equal to
U1(X(T
)) = EX(T
)[e (r+)T1V2(X(T  + T1); A1)]; (8)
we can reduce (7) to
V1(X(s)) = sup
T s
EX(s)[e (r+)(T
 s)(U1(X(T ))  I0)]: (9)
Although we like to solve the optimal stopping problem (9), it is computationally hard.
For, the payo function in (9), U1(), is not analytically derived but numerically computed.
Accordingly, it is impossible to check whether U1() satises some regularity conditions,
under which the optimal stopping time exists in a class of threshold policies.
We propose the following tractable method for computing the project value and opti-
mal policy. In the rst place, we restrict our attention within a class of threshold policies,
which are of the form, T x = infft  0 j X(t)  xg. This restriction is not very strong
because U1() is an increasing function. We now maximize the right-hand side of (9) by
moving threshold x rather than by moving stopping time T . At the initial time s = 0,
the problem of nding the project value and the optimal policy is equal to6
V1(x) = sup
x
Ex[e (r+)T

x (U1(X(T

x))  I0)]
= sup
xx
 x
x
~
(U1(x
)  I0); (10)
because we have Ex[e (r+)T x ] = (x=x)~ and X(T x) = x for x  x. The characteristic
root ~ is dened by (6) replaced r with r + .
Problem (10) is more tractable than problem (9) because it is an optimization problem
of one-dimensional function. Nevertheless, in general, computing U1() in (10) requires
multiple integration, dened by (8), which makes problem (10) dicult to compute. When
random variables (A1; T1) have discrete distributions, (8) can be reduced to a single in-
tegral with respect to X(t), which makes problem (10) computationally tractable. We
suppose N scenarios, in which (A1; T1) take (A
i
1; T
i
1) with probability p
i for i = 1; : : : ; N .
Then, problem (10) is reduced to
V1(x) = sup
xx
 x
x
~  NX
i=1
piEx

[e (r+)T
i
1V2(X(T
i
1); A
i
1)]  I0
!
; (11)
because (A1; T1) are independent of X(t). Problem (11) is computable so that it can help
practitioners to evaluate and optimize various cases of R&D investment. In section 3, we
will conduct numerical analysis by solving problem (11).
6To avoid unnecessary disorder, we use the same notation V1(x) in (10) as that of (9). Strictly, the project
value in (10) can be smaller than that of (9) because we restrict the rm's policies within the threshold policies.
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2.3 Levered case
In this subsection, as a supplement, we extend the base model in Section 2.2 by allowing
a rm to take the optimal capital structure in the growth project. In practice, an initial
stage of an R&D project, involving quite high risks, is dicult to be nanced by debt
issuance (e.g., Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009) and Hall and Lerner (2009)). After the
success in the rst stage, a rm is more likely to use debt nancing for a growth project
with less risks. For instance, Ho, Tjahjapranata, and Yap (2006) empirically showed
that the rm size and nancial leverage interactions inuence growth opportunities from
R&D investments. We explore the eects of the capital structure on R&D investment by
supposing that the rm can optimally use debt nancing for the growth project.
We build the levered setup on the dominant models by Fan and Sundaresan (2000),
Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), and Sundaresan and Wang (2007). Following Fan and
Sundaresan (2000) and Sundaresan and Wang (2007), we assume that the rm will be able
to avoid costly liquidation. Indeed, equity and debt holders negotiate and reduce coupon
payments when the cash ow X(t) is lower than a critical level. The rm's operation will
return to normal when X(t) restores beyond the critical level.
As in Section 2.2, we rst consider the growth investment problem by supposing that
the investment time T L, the level of technological success, A1, and research duration T1
are all known. We denote the levered case by subscript L. The expected prots after the
second investment time T L becomes
(1  )A1A2
r    X(T

L ) (12)
in the levered case with the optimal capital structure. Note that (12) =  (2). The
multiplier , which results from debt nancing, is a positive constant dened by
 = 1 +
(1  )
(1  (1  ))h(> 1); (13)
where
h =

(1  )
   
  1

(> 1) (14)
 =
1
2
  
2
 
s

2
  1
2
2
+
2r
2
(< 0): (15)
Constants  2 (0; 1) and  2 [0; 1] denote the proportion of the rm value which is lost
by liquidation and the bargaining power of equity holders in the renegotiation between
equity and debt holders, respectively. For details in derivation of (12){(15), refer to Fan
and Sundaresan (2000) and Sundaresan and Wang (2007).
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The growth option value, which corresponds to (4) in the unlevered case, becomes
U2L(X(s); A1)
= sup
T L s
EX(s)[e r(T

L  s)

(1  )A1(A2  1)
r    X(T

L )  I2

]
=
8>>><>>>:

(1  )A1(A2  1)xL (A1)
r      I2

X(s)
xL (A1)

(X(s) < xL (A1))
(1  )A1(A2  1)X(s)
r      I2 (X(s)  x

L (A1));
(16)
where the investment threshold xL (A1) is dened by
xL (A1) =
(r   )I2
(   1)(1  )A1(A2  1) : (17)
Note that (17) = (A2   1)=(A2   1) (5). Because of the optimal capital structure,
the growth option becomes more valuable, and then, the growth investment takes place
earlier. Because the rst stage project is executed by all-equity nancing, we can perform
the same discussion as that of Section 2.2 for the rst stage project by replacing U2()
with U2L(). In a similar fashion to (7){(11), we can compute the project value and the
optimal policy, and hence, we omit the description.
3 Numerical analysis and implications
3.1 Basic analysis
Our focus in this paper is not a case study of a specic R&D project. Instead, we show
numerical results for a wide range of parameter values, demonstrating several properties
of the project value and the optimal policy in a generic R&D project. We set the base
parameter values as
r = 0:08;  = 0:06;  = 0:2;  = 0:15;  = 0:3; (18)
following Leland (2004) and Sarkar (2008) based on the market data. There are several
methods for estimating the market parameters and discount rate in a real options model
(e.g., using the capital asset pricing model). For instance, Chapter 3 of Guthrie (2009)
explains the details of standard calibration methods.
On the other hand, technological parameter values, such as levels of technological
success, research duration, and investment costs, can be estimated by a project team.
These values greatly dier over the project types and the industries. For example, in
a project of developing a new drug, research duration is quite long, and the probability
of technological success is quite low (Kellogg and Charnes (2000),Loch and Bode-Greuel
(2001), Hartmann and Hassan (2006)). Considering the fact that the average duration
is around 2 to 4 years in a majority of the literature (e.g., Pakes and Schankerman
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(1984)), in the base case, we assume that T1 takes a value in f2; 3; 4g with probability
1=3. We consider three levels of technological success; A1 = 0 (failure), A1 = 1 (success
as expected), and A1 = 2 (success more than expected), and we assume that A1 takes a
value in f0; 1; 2g with probability 1=3.
Following the standard literature of economics, we assume the convexity of the invest-
ment costs, i.e., 1=I0 > (A2   1)=I2. Note that if 1=I0  (A2   1)=I2, the growth option
is likely to be exercised immediately after the success of the rst stage, which makes the
analysis uninteresting. For expositional purposes, we set I0 = 10; A2 = 2, and I2 = 20 in
the base case. Then, A1(A2   1)=I2 equals 1=20(< 1=I0) and 1=10(= 1=I0) for A1 = 1
and A1 = 2, respectively. This implies that the rm tends to postpone the growth project
when the rst stage results in the average success.
[Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 here.]
Table 1 presents the project values and investment triggers in the base case; the case
with no growth option (we set A2 = 1); the case in the presence of rival preemption (we
set  = 0:2); and the levered case (we set  = 0:5). We show the project value, V1(x),
for x = 0:2.7 Figure 1 shows the value functions V1(X(s)) (see (11)) in the cases that
correspond to Table 1.
First, we elaborate the result in the base case. The rm invests in the rst stage
project as soon as the cash ow X(t) hits the investment threshold x = 1:17, and the
R&D project will take T1 2 f2; 3; 4g years until completion. At completion time T  + T1,
the rm will know the level of technological success A1 2 f0; 1; 2g. If the R&D project
fails (A1 = 0), the rm will not receive any cash ow and will be nished with the
project. Consider the case in which the rst stage turns out to be successful. The rm
will receive cash ow A1X(t), and at the same time, it attains the growth opportunity. If
X(T  + T1) is larger than x(1) = 2:46, the rm will immediately invest in the growth
project and receive increased cash ow 2A1X(t). According to our computation, due to
X(T ) = 1:16 < 2:46, the probability of this scenario is very low (it is approximately 0:03).
If X(T +T1) takes a value in [1:23; 2:46), the growth option will be immediately exercised
only in the case of great success (A1 = 2). In the case of average success (A1 = 1), the rm
postpones the growth project until X(t) hits the investment trigger x(1) = 2:46. The
probability that X(T  + T1) 2 [1:23; 2:46) is 0:53. The last scenario is that X(T  + T1)
is less than x(2) = 1:23. In this scenario, the rm delays the second stage investment
until X(t) hits either 1:23 or 2:46, depending on A1. The probability of this scenario is
0:44.
7If one considers the expected waiting time until the project initiation, in the cases with no rival preemption
it is more practical to set x suciently close to the investment trigger x. However, for the purpose of comparing
all cases with the same parameter values, we used x = 0:2. The results are qualitatively robust as long as x is
smaller than x (see Figure 1).
11
We now briey explain the other cases and compare the results with those of the base
case. We can see from Figure 1 that a higher X(s) increases the gap between the base
case and the case with no growth option. This is because the value of the growth option
increases with a higher X(s). Because the project value becomes lower in the absence of
growth opportunity, the investment trigger x = 1:31 is higher than that of the base case.
The result is consistent with the stylized fact that growth opportunities increase a project
value and encourages investment.
The third row in Table 1 shows the case with preemption. Table 1 and Figure 1 present
the case of  = 0:2, which means that the expected time up to rival preemption is 5 years,
although we will show the results with varying levels of  later in this section. Figure 1
shows that the possibility of rival preemption greatly decreases the project value, especially
for a low X(s). Despite the decreased value, the rm tries to speed up investment because
rival preemption can occur before completion of the rst stage. Indeed, with  = 0:2,
the investment trigger x decreases to 0:44 from 1:16. There is no possibility of rival
preemption after completion of the rst stage, and then we have the same investment
triggers as those of the base case. Accordingly, the time lag between project completion
of the rst stage and the second investment is expected to be long.
We see from the last row in Table 1 that access to debt nancing increases the project
value and decreases the investment triggers. These leverage eects are consistent with
previous results by Hennessy (2004), Mauer and Sarkar (2005), and Sundaresan and Wang
(2007). In the levered case, we assume that the bargaining powers of equity and debt
holders are equal, i.e.,  = 0:5. The multiplier , caused by debt nancing, is equal to 1:14.
We will closely explore the eects of leverage in Section 3.4.
[Insert Figure 2 here.]
Figure 2 represents the project values V1(0:2) and investment triggers x
; x(1); and
x(2) with varying levels of . The other parameter values are the same as the base
case. Note that second investment triggers x(1) and x(2) do not depend on . We
see that V1(0:2) greatly decreases with . As expected from the expression (9), the graph
of V1(0:2) shows convexity. In other words, for a lower , the sensitivity is greater. For
instance, V1(0:2) decreases from 8:35 to 3:79 with a very small  = 0:05. In contrast to
the monotonic decrease in V1(0:2), the investment trigger x
 decreases until  = 0:12,
and after this point, it increases. The possibility of rival preemption decreases the project
value, but at the same time, it increases the rm's incentive to invest early and complete
the technology before its rivals. The non-monotonicity in x results from the trade-o. For
a lower , the sensitivity of x with respect to  is negative because the latter dominates
the former. On the other hand, for a higher , the sensitivity is positive because the
former dominates the latter.
[Insert Figure 3 here.]
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Figure 3 plots the project values V1(0:2) and investment triggers x
; x(1); and x(2)
with varying levels of the cash ow volatility .8 The other parameter values are set at the
base case. Similar to Chapter 5.2.A of Dixit and Pindyck (1994), we can easily prove that
U2(X(s); A1) and x
(A1) (see (4) and (5)) monotonically increase with . We can see
from Figure 3 that V1(0:2) and x
 also increase with . This result shows the robustness
of the standard theory that higher market uncertainty increases an option value and
delays the exercise of the option (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994)) even if we incorporate
several characteristics of R&D investment. We also examined the comparative statics
for a wide range of parameter values, including positive . We found that the standard
result is robust. Relatedly, Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) and Bar-Ilan and Strange (1998)
showed the similar eects, although their models do not include technological and rival
uncertainty.9
So far, we have explained the results that were more or less known in the prior liter-
ature. We also found several ndings that have not been addressed by previous studies.
In the following subsections, we will elaborate key ndings, logic behind the ndings, and
empirical implications.
3.2 Interactions between research duration and rival pre-
emption
In this subsection, we reveal the eects of research duration combined with rival preemp-
tion. In the presence of rival preemption, longer duration increases the probability that
other rms will complete the same technology rst. Then, we can expect some interac-
tions between research duration and rival preemption. Although Bar-Ilan and Strange
(1996) and Bar-Ilan and Strange (1998) examined the eects of duration in the absence
of rival preemption, to our knowledge, there are no papers that examine the mixed eects
of duration and rival preemption. We summarize new ndings below.
[Insert Figure 4 here.]
The upper and lower panels of Figure 4 show the project values V1(0:2) and investment
triggers x, respectively, with varying levels of research duration T1. In order to clarify the
eects of T1, we change levels of T1 from 1 to 5, instead of taking T1 as random variables.
10
In addition to the case with no rival preemption ( = 0), the panels plot V1(0:2) and x
 in
8For simplicity, we change , taking all other parameters, r and  as constants. This means that changes in 
have only an idiosyncratic risk component. Most of the literature, including Dixit and Pindyck (1994), presents
the comparative statics under this assumption, although some papers, including Wong (2007), examines the
comparative statics assuming the relation between  and .
9Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) highlight that the standard volatility eect does not always hold for investment
with an abandonment option in addition to investment lag.
10We have similar results for varying levels of E[T1] even if we consider T1 as a random variable.
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the cases with rival preemption ( = 0:1; 0:2; and 0:3) so that we can see the interactions
of research duration and rival preemption. The other parameter values are set at the base
case. The investment triggers x(A1) are independent of T1 and  and remain unchanged
from those of the base case in Table 1, and hence we omit plots of x(A1).
The upper panel of Figure 4 indicates the straightforward results that V1(0:2) mono-
tonically decreases with T1 and that the decrease is intensied with . That is, research
duration is more crucial to the rm as rival preemption is expected to occur earlier. As
expected from the expression (8), we nd stronger convexity of a graph for a higher . No-
tably, the lower panel shows that the sensitivity of x with respect to T1 depends greatly
on . In the absence of preemption x monotonically decreases with T1. The rm speeds
up investment considering that X(T ) is expected to go up to eT1X(T ) at completion
time.11 This result is well known in the previous researches such as Bar-Ilan and Strange
(1998) and Bar-Ilan and Strange (1998).
However, as seen from (8), a longer T1 decreases the project value especially when 
is high. This decrease in the project value leads to that x monotonically increases with
T1 for  = 0:1; 0:2; and 0:3 in the lower panel of Figure 4. According to our numerical
analysis, with the slightest threat of rival preemption ( = 0:01), the sensitivity of x with
respect to T1 remains positive, while in the case with no rival preemption the sensitivity
is negative. Thus, we conclude that in the presence of rival preemption, longer duration
delays the rm's project initiation due to the decreased project value. This result is in
sharp contrast with that of the case with no preemption.
Next, we explore the eects of uncertainty of research duration T1. Actually, research
duration can be extended from that of the initial schedule (e.g., Raz, Shenhar, and Dvir
(2002)), although previous studies do not examine the eects. In order to clarify the eects
of uncertainty of T1, we consider random variables T1 taking 1; 3; and 5 with probability
wT =2; 1 wT ; and wT =2, respectively, and vary levels of weight wT .12 The variance of T1
monotonically increases with wT , while we maintain that E[T1] = 3.
[Insert Figure 5 here.]
The upper and lower panels of Figure 5 show the project values V1(0:2) and investment
triggers x, respectively, with varying levels of weight wT . We exclude the graphs for  = 0,
which require very dierent scales, and we show the cases of  = 0:1; 0:2; and 0:3 in the
panels. The other parameter values are set at the base case. We can recognize from the
panels that a higher wT enhances V1(0:2) and decreases x
. The eects become stronger
11We do not consider the case of a negative  because a negative growth rate is not practical for an R&D
project.
12We have the same results for the base parameter value T1 2 f2; 3; 4g, but in order to highlight the results,
we presented the results for T1 2 f1; 3; 5g (of course, as the range of T1 is wider, the eects are clearer.) For
robustness, we also examined the comparative statics with respect to variance by changing the range of T1
rather than wT . The results are unchanged.
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as  is higher. The reasoning is as follows. As explained with regard to the upper panel
of Figure 4, U1() is convex with respect to T1 and the convexity is stronger with a higher
. By Jensen's inequality and the convexity, U1() increases with a higher wT , leading to
that a higher wT increases V1(0:2) and decreases x
. The impact of wT is magnied by a
higher .
In consequence, we have a key result that, combined with rival preemption, uncer-
tainty of research duration plays a role in improving the project value and speeding up
investment. Our result contrasts with the standard result that greater uncertainty tends
to enhance the value of waiting and delaying investment (cf. Figure 3). Our result
regards technological uncertainty that will not be dissolved by waiting, whereas the stan-
dard volatility eect is based on market uncertainty that will be dissolved by waiting.
This dierence causes the opposite eects of uncertainty. In an R&D project with high
technological uncertainty, unlike in a case with only market uncertainty, a rm possesses
incentive to dissolve technological uncertainty by accelerating investment. Our result is
consistent with the empirical evidence in Driver, Temple, and Urga (2006). They observed
positive eects of uncertainty on investment in industries with high R&D intensity.
3.3 Interactions between the growth option and uncertainty
of technological success
In this subsection, we examine the eects of uncertainty of technological success A1.
Although the real options literature have stressed the eects of market uncertainty on
investment, few papers have examined the eects of technological uncertainty on invest-
ment. Below, we reveal the eects of the variance of A1 on project value and investment
timing. We consider random variables A1 taking 0; 1; and 2 with probability wA=2; 1 wA;
and wA=2, respectively, and vary levels of weight wA. Note that the variance of A1 mono-
tonically increases with wA and E[A1] = 1 is always satised.
[Insert Figure 6 here.]
The upper and lower panels of Figure 6 show the project values V1(0:2) and investment
triggers x, respectively, with varying levels of wA. In order to examine interactions
between technological uncertainty and a growth opportunity, we plots the graphs for
dierent sizes of growth opportunity, i.e., A2 = 1:5; 2; 2:5, and 3. The other parameter
values are set at the base case. Note that in the case with no growth option (A2 = 1),
V1(0:2) and x
 are 4:16 and 1:31, respectively, for all wA. The second investment triggers
x(1) and x(2) do not depend on wA; indeed, we have x(2) = 2:46; 1:23; 0:82, and
0:62 for A2 = 1:5; 2; 2:5; and 3, respectively. The investment triggers x
(1) are twice as
large as x(2).
In Figure 6, we recognize that V1(0:2) monotonically increases with wA, while x

monotonically decreases with wA. These eects of wA become greater as A2 increases.
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The intuition behind the results is as follows. The growth option value U2(X(s); A1)
is not negative but zero even if the rst stage fails. On the other hand, U2(X(s); A1)
monotonically increases with A1(> 0). Because of this convexity of the growth option
and Jensen's inequality, a higher wA increases U2(X(s); A1). Considering the increased
value of the growth option, the rm decreases the investment trigger x for a higher wA.
Accordingly, the eects of uncertainty of A1 become stronger as the size of the growth
option, A2, is larger.
We conclude that higher uncertainty of technological success improves the project value
and encourages R&D investment by enhancing the growth option value. This argument
aligns with that of compound option cases, in which greater uncertainty may speed up the
exercise by increasing the embedded option value, although it contrasts with the standard
eect of uncertainty in the real options literature. Furthermore, we highlight that the
types of uncertainty determine the sensitivity of uncertainty on investment. Similar to
uncertainty of research duration in Section 3.2, uncertainty of technological success will
never be dissolved by waiting, and hence, the rm has no incentive to delay investment
and obtain extra information. Our result is also consistent with Driver, Temple, and
Urga (2006) who empirically showed that industries with high R&D intensity tend to
have positive eects of uncertainty on investment.
On the other hand, because x(1) and x(2) are constants, a higher wA increases
the lag between completion of the rst stage and initiation of the second stage project
for a xed A1. For instance, we take a look at the probability that the rm proceeds to
the second stage immediately after completion of the rst stage project. As explained
in Section 3.1, in the base case (wA = 2=3), the rm proceeds to the growth project
immediately after the success of the rst stage with probability 0:03, and it proceeds
immediately to the growth project only in the case of great success with probability
0:53. For wA = 0:1, due to the increased trigger x
 = 1:26, the probabilities go up to
0:06 and 0:6, respectively. Although one considers from this that a higher wA lengthens
the waiting time, the interpretation is not correct in terms of the prior probabilities.
Indeed, the prior probabilities that the rm invests in the second stage project right after
completion of the rst stage project are 0:03  2=3 + 0:53  1=3 = 0:2 for wA = 2=3
and 0:06  19=20 + 0:6  1=20 = 0:09 for wA = 0:1. The ex ante expected waiting time
also decreases with wA. Therefore, we can state that greater uncertainty of technological
success accelerates R&D investment.
3.4 Eects of leverage
Lastly, we explore the eects of the use of debt nancing. Note that debt nancing is
available only for the second stage project with no risks of technological failure. We
readily see from (16) and (17) that leverage increases the growth option value U2L(X(s))
and decreases the second investment trigger xL (A1). These correspond to the results
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in Sundaresan and Wang (2007). We now turn to the initial project value V1(0:2) and
investment trigger x.
[Insert Figure 7 here.]
The upper and lower panels of Figure 7 show the project values V1(0:2) and investment
triggers x, respectively, in both unlevered and levered cases with varying sizes of growth
opportunity A2. We take the size of growth opportunity A2 as the horizontal axis because
leverage inuences the rm through the growth project. Naturally, the leverage eects
increase with A2. For comparison, in the lower panel, we present the second investment
triggers x(2) in addition to x, but we omit x(1), which is twice as high as x(2).
We can see from the upper panel of Figure 7 that V1(0:2) in the levered case is 1:16 to
1:17 times higher than that of the base case. The lower panel shows that x and x(2)
in the levered case are lower than those of the base case. Thus, access of debt nancing
increases the project value and accelerates investment in the R&D project. This leverage
eect is consistent with the prior literature (e.g., Hennessy (2004), Mauer and Sarkar
(2005), and Sundaresan and Wang (2007)).
We now look at the lower panel of Figure 7 more closely. We nd that the impact
of leverage on x is weaker than that on x(2). This is probably because debt nancing
inuences the growth investment directly, while it inuences the rst stage investment at
second hand. As a result, leverage tends to decrease the waiting period between success
of the rst project and initiation of the growth project. Indeed, for A2 = 2, we have
x = 1:05 > x(2) = 0:96 in the levered case, while we have x = 1:16 < x(2) = 1:23
in the base case. Most of empirical studies stated that large rms have advantages over
small rms in growth opportunities from R&D investment (e.g., Ho, Tjahjapranata, and
Yap (2006)). Our result could be related to the evidence because larger rms that suer
less nancing costs are more likely to approximate the optimal capital structure.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a real options model for evaluating and optimizing an R&D
project. The model can capture the eects of various features of R&D investment such
as research duration, growth opportunity, and technological, demand market, and rival
preemption uncertainty; nevertheless, the model is computationally tractable so that it
can help real-world decision-making process of R&D investment. Further, we presented
numerical results for a wide range of parameter values and unveiled several interactions
of the key features of R&D. Below, we summarize notable results.
In the absence of rival preemption, the rm speeds up investment in a project with
longer research duration, but a slight possibility of rival preemption reverses this eect of
duration. Indeed, longer duration drives the rm to delay investment because it increases
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the possibility of rival preemption and decreases the project value. As uncertainty of
research duration and technological success of the R&D project is higher, the project
value increases and the optimal investment time is earlier. A higher possibility of rival
preemption intensies the eects of uncertainty of duration because it strengthens the
convexity of the project value with respect to duration. On the other hand, the eects
of uncertainty of technological success are amplied by an increase in the growth option.
Access to debt nancing in the growth project increases the project value and accelerates
investment, but the impact on the rst stage is relatively weak. Our results can potentially
account for several empirical ndings.
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Table 1: Project values and investment triggers.
V1(0:2) x
 x(1) x(2)
Base 8:35 1:16 2:46 1:23
No growth 4:16 1:31 N/A N/A
Preemption 0:63 0:44 2:46 1:23
Leverage 9:77 1:05 1:93 0:96
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Figure 1: Value functions. The gure plots the project value functions V1(X(s)) in the base
case, the case with no growth option (A2 = 1), the case with rival preemption ( = 0:2), and
the levered case ( = 0:5).
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Figure 2: Eects of rival preemption. This gure plots the project values V1(0:2) and investment
triggers x; x(1); and x(2) with varying levels of . The other parameter values are set at
the base case.
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Figure 3: Eects of market uncertainty. This gure plots the project values V1(0:2) and in-
vestment triggers x; x(1); and x(2) with varying levels of market uncertainty . The other
parameter values are set at the base case.
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Figure 4: Eects of research duration. The upper and lower panels plot the project values
V1(0:2) and investment triggers x
 with varying levels of research duration T1, respectively.
The gure shows the cases of  = 0; 0:1; 0:2; and 0:3. The other parameter values are are set
at the base case.
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Figure 5: Eects of uncertainty of research duration. The upper and lower panels plot the
project values V1(0:2) and investment triggers x
 with varying levels of wT , respectively. The
gure shows the cases of  = 0; 0:1; 0:2; and 0:3. The other parameter values are set at the
base case.
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Figure 6: Eects of uncertainty of technological success. The upper and lower panels plot the
project values V1(0:2) and investment triggers x
 with varying levels of wA, respectively. The
gure shows the cases of A2 = 1:5; 2; 2:5; and 3. The other parameter values are set at the base
case.
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Figure 7: Eects of leverage. The upper and lower panels plot the project values V1(0:2) and
investment triggers x and x(2), respectively, in both base and levered cases with varying
sizes of growth opportunity A2. The other parameter values are set at the base case.
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